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Abstract 
Since the Middle East has the highest defense burden (defense expenditures as 
a share of gross domestic product) in the developing world, it is of some interest 
to assess the extent military expenditures have influenced national efforts at 
expanding investment. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to assess whether 
military expenditures in five of the major defense spenders, namely Algeria, 
Egypt, Syria, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, have been at the expense of physical 
capital accumulation as well as other macroeconomic aggregates. 
After finding series free of unit roots, the methodology used consisted of a series 
of Granger Causality tests modified by a Hsiao procedure to identify the optimal 
timing of impact. While there is little evidence supporting the position that 
investment or growth causes defense, many countries have developed fairly 
elaborate feedback mechanisms whereby defense impacts on investment and 
growth and in tum is affected by that growth. In addition, while there is little 
evidence that defense hurts investment or growth, there is ample support for the 
position that: (a) the relationship betw~en defense and investment or growth 
varies considerably among countries, and (b) the lag structures also differ greatly. 
1. Introduction 
One can easily argue (Cummings et al., 1980) that the post-1973/74 
expansion in military expenditures undertaken over the last several decades 
90 Robert E. LOONEY 
in the Middle East has pr~mpted resources capable of contributing to 
physical capital formation. As a result, military expenditures have tended to 
frustrate national development programs, especially those of the non-oil 
exporting countries (Hewitt, 1993). 
While this view makes intuitive sense, it is conceivable that military 
expenditures do not necessarily reduce economic growth in developing 
countries. Defense expenditures may act as an economic stimulus in such 
ways as financing heavy industry and the acquisition of, advanced 
technologies, providing employment, and attracting investment. · 
Since the Middle East has the highest defense burden (defense 
expenditure as a share of gross domestic product) in the developing world, 
it is of some interest to assess the extent military expenditures have 
influenced national efforts at expanding investment. The purpose of this 
paper, therefore, is to assess whether military expenditures in five of the 
major defense spenders, namely Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Israel, and Saudi 
Arabia, have been at the expense of physical capital accumulation as well as 
other macroeconomic aggregates. As a basis of comparison, we undertook a 
similar analysis using other categories of public expenditures. 
2. Literature survey: the impact of defense expenditures 
A body of conventional wisdom has amassed over the years concerning 
the causes and consequences of Third World militarisation. More often than 
not in the early literature this wisdom has been anecdotal and biased towards 
the standard "guns versus butter" analogies. Since the modem defense 
establishment is a heavy consumer of technical and managerial manpower 
and foreign exchange, resources that are especially scarce in the Third World, 
the conventional argument is that increased defense burdens should reduce 
the overall rate of growth (Chan, 1987; Deger and West 1987). 
To test this theory, a rapidly growing body of empirical research has 
attempted to identify the impact of defense spending on various aspects of 
economic development and growth. Numerous studies have grown out of the 
debate. Unfortunately, no consensus has emerged. In the original study, 
Benoit (1978) found strong eviden& to suggest that defense spending 
encouraged the growth of civilian output per capita in less developed 
countries. 
On the other hand, Rothschild (1977) concluded that increased military 
expenditures lowered economic growth by reducing exports in fourteen 
OECD countries during 1956-69. In his examination of 54 developing 
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countries for the sample period 1965-73, Lim (1983) found defense spending 
to be detrimental to economic growth. Deger and Sen (1983), Leontief and 
Duchin (1983), and Faini et al. (1984), Biswas and Ram (1986), and Grobar 
and Porter (1989) also found evidence refuting the claim that defense 
spending stimulates economic growth. 
In contrast, research that examines the economic impact of Third World 
military expenditure by utilising various sub-groupings of countries tended 
to contradict these findings. Much of this research implicitly argues that in 
certain economic situations it is possible by creating a stable environment 
that added defense expenditures may stimulate higher rates of investment, 
technological progress, technology transfer and hence increased overall 
growth (Wolf, 1981). 
This research has gone through various stages and levels of 
sophistication, with the initial studies largely based on ordinary least squares 
regression techniques using Benoit's data set for the 1950-65 period. The 
original study (Frederiksen and Looney, 1982) using this methodology 
grouped countries on the basis of discriminant analysis with savings and 
investment used as discriminating variables and found that countries with 
relatively high levels of savings and investment experienced positive impacts 
on growth, while the impact was statistically insignificant for countries 
experiencing low levels of savings and investment. 
A second study (Frederiksen and Looney, 1983) also used Benoit's 
sample countries. However, it grouped countries largely on the basis of 
foreign exchange earnings, import elasticity, and productivity of investment. 
Again, relatively unconstrained countries experienced positive impacts on 
growth stemming from defense expenditures, while the relatively foreign 
exchange constrained countries showed a statistically insignificant but 
negative impact. 
Using a later time period, 1965-73, and again grouping developing 
countries on the basis of their relative savings and investment, Frederiksen 
and Looney (1985) found that the relatively unconstrained countries enjoyed 
a positive impact from defense expenditures. 
These initial studies examined only the impact of defense expenditures 
on growth. More recent analysis in the area has been more sophisticated, 
employing more elaborate statistical devices and/or more subtle country 
groupings. For example, Third World military producers (defined in Neuman, 
1984) experienced positive impacts from military expenditures on growth, 
investment, savings, but declines in productivity in the 1970-82 period 
(Looney, 1989a). Non-producers experienced declines in growth and 
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investment. 
In recent years, analysis has branched into more complex issues, and 
utilised both time series (Looney, 1986; 1987; 1988) and simultaneous 
equation models estimated by two and three stage least squares regression 
techniques. These studies introduce the demand for military expenditures into 
the analysis to allow for feedbacks from the macro-economy to defense 
(Giymah-Brempong, 1989). Interestingly enough, the results (Looney and 
Frederiksen, 1986; Mohammed 1993a; 1993b) produced by these techniques 
tend to confirm the results obtained from simpler, more naive models. 
In short, the research summarised above demonstrates a consistent pattern 
whereby certain groups of Third World countries -usually the more 
successful economically, the more stable politically, or those engaged in 
military production- derive positive impacts on investment and growth from 
military spending (Looney 1989b; 1991). Those countries less successful 
economically, more politically unstable or lacking a domestic arms industry 
fail to derive any positive economic impacts from defense expenditures. 
Having said this, it is important to note that a number of adverse effects 
stem from defense expenditures. This is true even in those countries 
experiencing higher overall rates of growth from increased allocations to 
defense. In particular, countries with an indigenous arms industry may suffer 
a deterioration in the distribution of income from added defense expenditures 
(Looney, 1989a). The same may also occur in military regimes as the 
authorities shift income from urban consumers to industrial groups (Looney, 
1989c). 
A major limitation of the studies cited above is that, by their nature 
cross-sectional studies are very aggregative, so that applying them to specific 
countries is hazardous at best. Obviously they are also incapable of capturing 
the dynamics (Federiksen and Looney, 1994) associated with time. Lebovic 
and Ishaq's (1987) study of defense spending in the Middle East attempts to 
overcome these deficiencies. Using a pooled time-series, cross-sectional 
analysis on various groupings of Middle Eastern States, they found that 
higher military spending tended to suppress economic growth in the non-oil 
states of the Middle East during the 1973-84 period. 
However, while Lebovic and Isha\} drew on time series data, they were 
not able to incorporate the potential effects of lags between the time defense 
expenditures occur and the period of maximum economic impact. In this 
regard, Babin (1989) has noted that incorporating the time variable into 
analysis can be critical because some relationships that may exist over time 
disappear in the short-run and vice versa. Clearly at the national level, 
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development usually requires a series of changes that occur through systems, 
which involve organisations, agencies, economic structures and technological 
change (Babin, 1989: 249). Consequently (as Babin concludes), it is 
unjustifiable to assume that a country's defense spending will have an 
immediate, or even short-term, effect on national economic performance. 
Babin's main finding was that while short-run economic impacts o'f 
defense expenditure may be nil or even negative, the longer term effect on 
growth is likely to be positive. Along these lines, Kick and Sharda's (1986) 
analysis suggests that an increase in the military manpower ratio has a 
significant positive effect on infrastructure and social welfare. This impact 
occurs with a long (twelve year) lag. Kick and Sharda also found that the 
relationship over a twelve year period is positive. Militarisation, whether 
measured by expenditures or size of the military, does contribute to 
development. 
3. The issue of causation 
Nearly all of the studies noted above have implicitly accepted Benoit's 
(1978: 276) original assertion that " ... the direct interaction between growth 
and defense burdens seems to run primarily from defense burdens to growth 
rather than vice versa. It seems clear that in the sample countries higher 
defense burdens simulate growth." While this may well be true, it is simply 
an assertion and not based on empirical evidence. In fact, there is a high 
likelihood that defense expenditures may simply reflect economic conditions 
and not be an initiator of economic change. As an extreme case, it is obvious 
that increased defense expenditures in Saudi Arabia largely reflect 
improvements in the international oil markets and hence the country's 
expanded gross domestic product (GDP). While defense expenditures might 
feed back to affect GDP, this impact would be minimal by comparison. 
It follows that before drawing any definitive conclusions as to the impact 
of defense expenditures, one must satisfactorily address the issue of 
causation. Fortunately several statistical tests are gaining wider acceptance for 
this purpose. To date, the original and most widely used causality test is one 
developed by Granger (1969; 1988) .• 
3.1. Granger test 
Granger (1969) defines causality such that X Granger causes (G-C) Y if 
Y can be predicted more accurately in the sense of mean square error, with 
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the use of past values of X than without using past X. Based upon the 
definition of Granger causality, a simple bivariate autoregressive (AR) model 
for defense and GDP can be specified as follows: 
p q 




DEF, - f + L dpEFH + L epDP,_i + v, 
i-1 j-1 
(2) 
where GDP is the gross domestic product and DEF refers to defense 
expenditures; p, q, r and s are lag lengths for each variable in the equation; 
and u and v are serially uncorrelated white noise residuals. By assuming that 
error terms (u, v) are "nice", ordinary least squares (OLS) becomes the 
appropriate estimation method.1 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F-test 
is appropriate for causal detection: 
F={[RSS, - RSSuJ/[df, - dfuJ} I [RSSufdfuJ (3) 
where RSS, and RSSu are the residual sum of squares of restricted and 
unrestricted models, respectively; and df, and dfu are, respectively, the 
degrees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner. First, 
unidirectional causality from DEF to GDP if the F-test rejects the null 
hypothesis that past values of DEF in equation (1) are insignificantly different 
from zero and if the F-Test cannot reject the null hypothesis that past values 
of GDP in equation (2) are insignificantly different from zero. That is, DEF 
causes GDP but GDP does not cause DEF. Unidirectional causality runs from 
GDP to DEF if the reverse is true. Second, bidirectional causality runs 
If the disturbances of the model were serially correlated, the OLS estimates would be 
inefficient, although still unbiased, and would distort the causal relations. The existence of 
serial correlation was checked by using a maximum likelihood correlation for the first-order 
autocorrelation of the residuals [AR(l)). The comparison of both OLS and AR(l) results 
indicated that no significant changes appeared in causal directions. Therefore, we can 
conclude "roughly" that serial correlation was not serious in this model. 
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between DEF and GDP if both F-test statistics reject the null hypotheses in 
equations (1) and (2). Finally, no causality exists between DEF and GDP if 
we cannot reject both null hypotheses at the conventional significance level. 
Joerding (1986) has tested the defense growth hypothesis using Granger 
causality methods. That is, he tested for the assumed exogeneity of defense 
budgets. Using a pooled sample containing 15 observations from each of 57 
countries, Joerding employed a multivariate model which also included 
investment and government spending and concluded that defense expenditures 
are not strongly exogenous and that previous studies were flawed. 
While Joerding's work provides insight into the nature of the relationship 
between defense and growth, there are three issues that merit further attention 
(LaCivita and Frederiksen, 1991): 
1. Joerding lumps all countries into one sample. This suggests a 
commonalty of causal relationships across diverse economic environments. 
As was shown by Frederiksen and Looney (1983; 1985), splitting a pooled 
sample into separate groups (in their case based on the level of relative 
resource constraints) can lead to quite different results. 
2. By aggregating the sample, Joerding assumed a common lag structure 
for all of the countries in the sample (in his study, four years on the defense 
and growth variables). If a causal relationship does exist (either defense to 
growth or growth to defense) we could expect the time lags to differ from 
country to country. 
3. Joerding's method for choosing lag length was ad hoc. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of 
lag length (Chowdhury, 1991). If the chosen lag length is less than the true 
lag length, the omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is 
greater than the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes 
estimates to be inefficient. 
While Joerding chose his lag lengths based on preliminary partial 
autocorrelation methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths 
equal for all of our sample countries. For example, in a study of the 
Philippines, Frederiksen and LaCivita (1987) found no statistical relationship 
between growth and defense when both variables had a lag equal to four. 
With a lag length of two perio~, however, growth caused defense. Since 
both lag lengths are arbitrary, one cannot form an objective conclusion as to 
the direction of causation. 
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3.2. The Hsiao procedure 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsiao (1981) developed a 
systematic method for assigning lags. This method combines Granger 
Causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean 
square prediction error, to determine the optimum lag for each variable. In 
a paper examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, 
Thornton and Batten (1985) found Hsiao's method to be superior to both 
arbitrary lag length selection and several other systematic procedures for 
determining lag length. 
The first step in Hsiao procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive 
regressions on the dependent variable. In the first regression, the dependent 
variable has a lag of one. This increases by one in each succeeding 
regression. Here, we estimate M regressions of the form: 
m 
G, = a + L b;G,_; + e, 
i-1 
(4) 
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we compute 
the FPE in the following manner: 
FPEm = [(T+m+l) ESSmtr] I (T-m-1) (5) 
where T is the sample size, and FPEm and ESSm are the final prediction error 
and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal lag length, m*, is 
the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Having determined m *, 
additional regressions expand the equation with the lags on the other variable 
added sequentially in the same manner used to determine m*. Thus we 
estimate four regressions of the form: 
m• n 
G, - a + L biGt-i + L c1Dt-i + e, 
i-1 j-1 
(6) 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for 
each regression as: 
FPEm•,n = [(T + m* + n + 1) ESSm-,/T]/(T - m* - n - 1) (7) 
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we choose the optimal lag length, n*, as the lag length which produces the 
lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is 
equivalent to using a series of F-tests with variable levels of significance.2 
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term 
measures the modeling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality 
property (Hsiao, 1979: 326) that "balances the risk due to bias when a lower 
order is selected and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher 
order is selected". As noted by Judge et al. (1982), an intuitive reason for 
using the FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the fitst term but decrease 
the RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing forces are optimally 
balanced when their product reaches its minimum. 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases are 
possible: (a) Defense causes Growth -occurring when the prediction error for 
growth falls when the equation includes defense. In addition, when growth 
is added to the defense equation, the final prediction error increases; (b) 
Growth causes Defense -occurring when the prediction error of growth 
increases when defense is added to the regression equation for growth, and 
is reduced when growth is added to the regression equation for defense; (c) 
Feedback -occurring when the final prediction error decreases when defense 
is added to the growth equation, and the final prediction error decreases when 
growth is added to the defense equation; and ( d) No Relationship -occurs 
when the final prediction error increases when defense is added to the growth 
equation, and also increases when growth is added to the defense equation. 
4. Methodology 
The data for military expenditures used to carry out the Hsiao tests are 
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook, 
World Armaments and Disarmament. Annual data on Gross Domestic Product 
is from various issues of the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook. When consistent price deflators were not 
available, we introduced the growth of the defense burden (the share of 
defense in GDP) into the regression equations. 
Several conceptual problems rematn. First, most economic time series are 
Since the F-statistic is redundant in this instance they are not reported here. They are, 
however, available form the author upon request. 
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non-stationary. As indicated by Judge et al. (1982) "stationarity is an 
important property as it guarantees that there are no fundamental changes in 
the structure of the process that would render prediction difficult or 
impossible". To overcome this problem, we used the rates of growth of each 
variable in the estimated equations3• Regressing these transformed series on 
a constant and time produced coefficients that were different from zero for 
all countries. Similar regressions of the untransformed levels indicated the 
presence of a trend. 
Second, military expenditures may affect the macro-economy in a way 
similar to that associated with other types of public expenditure. If this is the 
case any adverse affects identified may not be due to military expenditures 
per se, but government expenditures in general. To test for this possibility, 
we undertook additional regressions using (when available) figures on 
government consumption and/or public sector capital formation in place of 
defense expenditures. If the results were significantly different using these 
other forms of public spending, we concluded that the defense/growth 
relationship was unique and not simply a reflection of the general nature of 
public expenditures. 
Finally, investment is only one of many macro variables capable of 
providing insights as to the implications for longer run development. As a 
basis of comparison, we substituted other macro aggregates such as GDP, 
inflation, and imports for capital formation4• 
5. Results 
The results (Table 1) for our five countries indicate the direction of 
causation, together with the optimal lag for each macro aggregate. 
Algeria 
In terms of the defense impact/causality issue, the main findings (Table 
The Dickey-Fuller (1979) method was u~d to address the issue of non-stationarity and 
cointegration aspects of the time series used. See the Appendix for a full discussion of the 
method and main findings. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting the 
desirability of including these tests. 
These variables are only reported here when a causal relationship was found. 
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1) suggest that: 
1. No statistically significant relationships occur between defense and 
investment. 
2. With regard to other macroeconomic aggregates, causation is from 
defense to growth. This relationship is positive, with the lag between defense 
and growth relatively short (one year). However, the final prediction error for 
growth to defense was only slightly lower than that obtained from the growth 
to defense regression. 
3. Perhaps because of their rapid increase in the mid- to late 1970s, 
Algerian defense expenditures have created inflationary pressures. These 
pressures occur over time with a lag period of around four years, making 
budgetary control of inflation difficult. 
4. While exogenous in terms of their impact on GDP growth and the rate 
of inflation, defense expenditures themselves also seem to lead to a general 
expansion in government consumption. That is, defense expenditures appear 
more flexible than other types of government expenditures, expanding and 
contracting before budgetary changes in other public allocations. This finding 
suggests that defense is a semi-luxury good, expanding rapidly when extra 
revenues are available, but cut back during periods of austerity. 
5. Defense expenditures also follow general expansions in imports, 
suggesting that they are largely responsive to the relaxation of foreign 
exchange constraints. 
Defense burdens are relatively low in Algeria. If defense does have an 
impact on the economy, it is probably slight albeit positive. Excessive 
defense expenditures may have an inflationary impact, perhaps because they 
occur largely in the domestic market, rather than manifesting themselves in 
increased imports. 
Egypt 
Egyptian defense expenditures fluctuated widely, resulting in a 
corresponding differential impact on the country's leading economic 
aggregates (Table · 1 ): 
1. The major difference between defense expenditures and general 
government current expenditure lies in their respective impacts on real gross 
capital formation: (a) Increases in the defense burden (the share of defense 
in GDP) have a strong impact ·on investment. This impact occurs over a four 
year period, not only for the period as a whole, but for each of the 
sub-periods as well. (b) In contrast, changes in government consumption 
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Table 1 
Middle East: Summary of Country Expenditure Patterns 
Statistically Significant Directions of Causation 
Causal Relationship Time Direction of Optimal Lag 
Period Causation (Years) Strength 
Algeria 
Defense11nvestment 1967-88 No-Relationship 
Defense/GDP 1967-88 Def --. GDP(+) (1) Weak 
Defense/Inflation 1967-88 Def--. Inf(+) (4) Strong 
Defense/Imports 1967-87 Import --. Def(+) (3) Moderate 
Egypt 
Defense/Investment 1965-88 Def --. Invest(+) (4) Strong 
Gov Cons/Investment 1970-87 Gov Cons-. Inv(-) (1) Moderate 
Defense/GDP 1965-80 Def--. GDP(-) (1) Moderate 
Gov Consumption/GDP 1965-80 Feedback(-) (1) Moderate 
Defense/Imports 1965-87 Def--. Imp(+) (4) Strong 
Gov Cons/Imports 1965-87 Def--. Imp(+) (4) Weak 
Syria 
Defense/Investment 1962-87 Feedback(+) (4) Strong 
Defense/GDP 1962-87 Feedback(+) (4) Strong 
Defense/Imports 19,62-87 Feedback(+) (4) Strong 
Israel 
Defense/Investment 1955-87 Def --. Invest(+) (4) Strong 
Defense/GDP 1955-87 GDP--. Def(+) (3) Moderate 
Gov Cons/GDP 1955-87 GDP --. Gov Cons(+) (1) Moderate 
Saudi Arabia 
Defense/Investment 1965-88 No Relationship 
Defense/GDP 1965-88 GDP --. Defense (3) Strong 
Defense/Non-Oil GDP 1965-88 Feedback(-) (1) Strong 
Gov Invest/Non-Oil GDP 1965-88 GDP--. Gov Inv(+) (1) Strong 
Gov Cons/Non-Oil GDP 1965-88 GDP--. Gov Cons(+) (2) Weak 
Defense/Non-Oil GDP 1970-88 Defense --. GDP(+) (1) Weak 
Gov Cons/Non-Oil GDP 1970-88 GDP --. Gov Cons(+) (1) Weak 
Gov Invest/Non-Oil GDP 1970-88 Feedback(+) (1) Strong 
Note: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests using a Hsiao Procedure to 
determine the optimal lag, i.e., a four year lag indicates that most of the impact from the expenditures 
or GDP in any one year tends to be distributed ~ver four successive years. See the Appendix for a 
discussion of the tests used to determine stationarity and cointegration aspects of the time series used. 
impacted negatively (with a one year Jag) on gross capital formation. 
2. If one considers the 1965-87 period as a whole, no statistical pattern 
occurs between the growth of the defense burden and overall gross domestic 
product. However, over the earlier 1975-80 period, defense expenditures had 
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a negative impact on real GDP. Finally, the second sub-period, 1970--87, 
experienced little or no interrelation between defense and the economy as a 
whole. 
3. To determine if the economic impact of defense expenditures was 
unique to that category of government allocations, we undertook similar tests 
using the growth in the share of government consumption in GDP. The main 
finding here was that government consumption also showed little relationship 
to GDP over the period as a whole. 
4. On the other hand, the impact of government consumption 
expenditures in the two sub-periods was somewhat different than that of 
defense: (a) for the 1965-80 period, government consumption interacted with 
GDP, tending as with defense to reduce GDP with a one year lag, and (b) 
government consumption was determined by GDP over the 1970--87 period. 
From this we can conclude that defense allocations respond to factors other 
than pure internal economic conditions, while other types of government 
expenditure are more responsive to changes in the country's underlying 
economic base. 
5. Both defense and general government consumption expenditures are 
fairly import intensive with increases in each leading to a follow-on 
expansion in imports. However, there is one major difference between the 
two types of expenditures in that in the 1970--87 period increased imports 
also facilitated increases in government consumption (but not in defense 
expenditures). Again, this finding demonstrates the relative reliance of 
government consumption on the country's underlying resource base. 
From these patterns, a general picture emerges whereby defense 
expenditures in Egypt have a number of positive linkages with the economy 
as a whole. In particular, increased defense expenditures appear to increase 
the profitability of investment over time, with the ultimate effect of higher 
rates of investment than would have otherwise been the case. On the other 
hand, the fairly strong import effect associated with defense expenditures may 
at times have compounded the country's foreign exchange problems, thus 
causing a general contraction of the economy. This phenomenon appears to 
have been present before 1980, but was not a factor in the preceding years, 
perhaps as a result of United States Jbilitary aid. 
These results are suggestive of a Military Keynesianism (Looney, 1989b; 
1991) effect (the use of procurement from local arms industries to stabilise 
the economy) associated with Egyptian defense expenditures. In fact, similar 
patterns occur in other Third World arms producers (Looney and Frederiksen, 
1990). 
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In situations where governments have used defense expenditures to 
stabilise the economy, a characteristic pattern is one where fluctuations in 
defense allocations offset deviations (positive or negative) in the expansion 
of the overall economy. That is, when the economy is growing faster thari its 
trend (and overheating occurs) defense expenditures decline to reduce overall 
demand. Similarly, during recessionary periods, defense expenditures expand 
to increase aggregate demand and thus employment. 
Apparently, because of direct links to indigenous arms industries, the 
multiplier effect associated with defense expenditures is greater than that with 
other types of government procurement. The resulting income and 
employment multiplier is higher and therefore defense expenditures are the 
preferred way of fine tuning the economy. 
Syria 
In a comprehensive survey of the Syrian economy, the World Bank 
(1986), noting that the economy averaged around 10 percent real growth rate 
over the 197~2 period, argued that the main sources of this growth were 
government expenditures, including military expenditures. In addition, the 
Bank contends that rapid increases in investment also contributed to this 
period's rapid economic expansion. From this the Bank concludes that there 
has been an increasing dependence of the Syrian economy on government 
expenditures in general and defense expenditures in particular. 
This interdependence, whereby expenditures positively affect growth, with 
growth in tum delineating the amount of resources available for future 
expenditures, is apparent from the causality tests undertaken for the 1962-87 
period (Table 1 ): · 
1. Increases in the defense burden impacted strongly on investment. This 
impact occurs over time, averaging four years. In tum, increases in 
investment provided a short-run (one year) stimulus to the defense budget. 
The same patterns held for defense and gross domestic product. 
2. A fairly strong set of interrelationships occurs between defense and 
imports, with defense contributing to the country's import burden. In tum, 
additional imports facilitate an expansion of the country's expenditures on 
defense. 
3. The same pattern occurs between defense and two other main 
macroeconomic aggregates, namely gross fixed capital formation and private 
consumption (with private consumption probably simply mirroring the 
movements in overall gross domestic product). 
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From these findings, it is apparent that defense expenditures in Syria have 
aided the country's economic expansion. However, given the relatively large 
import effect associated with defense expenditures, other types of public 
allocations may have been (or at least were potentially) more effective in this 
regard. 
Israel 
While Israel's military burden is one of the highest in the world, there is 
little evidence to indicate any negative impacts on the growth of gross 
domestic product associated with expanded allocations to the military (Table 
1): 
1. Defense expenditures appear to have had a generally positive impact on 
fixed capital formation. That is, increases in defense expenditure have, with 
a one year lag, stimulated increased rates of investment. 
2. As a basis of comparison, tests using increases in the government 
consumption/GDP ratio indicated a similar pattern with the exception of the 
1967-87 period. During this time increases in GDP (in contrast to the 
situation with defense) maintained their positive impact on government 
consumption. On the other hand, there is little evidence that government 
consumption was (in contrast to defense) able to stimulate increases in gross 
capital formation. 
3. For the period as a whole (1955-87) there is a fairly strong positive 
relationship from GDP leading to increased defense expenditures (with an 
average lag structure of three years). 
4. While this same relationship held for the twenty year period of 
1955-75, it appears to have broken down in recent years; during the 1967-87 
period there was no statistically significant relationship between the growth 
in defense expenditures and that of the overall economy. 
A similar contrasting pattern with respect to imports exists between 
defense expenditures and general government consumption. While both 
categories of expenditures show no relationship with imports over the 
1955-75 period, increases in defense expenditures cause increases in imports 
over the 1967-87 period. During this time frame, increases in imports permit 
government consumption to expand. 
These import patterns suggest that the impact of defense expenditures on 
the economy is fundamentally different from that of other types of 
government allocation. In addition, this differentiation appears to be 
increasing with time. In recent years, defense expenditures received a high 
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priority, with non-defense expenditures allowed to expand only when excess 
resources are available. 
The ability of defense expenditures (as opposed to governm~nt 
consumption) to stimulate gross capital formation is consistent with a model 
of foreign aid recently developed by McGuire (1987). According to McGuire, 
foreign aid creates several price and income movements in the recipient 
country. For Israel, United States aid has created an indirect stimulus to 
investment via the complementarity between investment and defense. In 
addition, aid provides significant resources (via tax relief) to ·the private 
sector. Subsequently, these resources flow into capital formation. "It appears 
in summary, that a significant fraction of United States aid goes to support 
capital formation in Israel via this diversion of resources" (McGuire, 1987: 
867). In short, United States military grants to Israel have not only allowed 
the country to increase military expenditures rapidly in the short-run, but 
perhaps more importantly, to increase them in a way that was not detrimental 
to investment and economic growth. 
Saudi Arabia 
While defense expenditures have in a general sense mirrored the 
developments in the oil sector, the pattern is complex and has altered over 
time (Looney, 1987). There appears to be a structural shift associated with 
the oil price increases in the early 1970s that sets the 1960-73 period 
somewhat apart from the latter years. The impact (on a dollar per dollar 
basis) of the oil sector on defense was stronger in the earlier period. 
Specifically, for the 1960-85 period as a whole, the short-run marginal 
propensity of the government to spend on defense was 0.03, with a longer 
run propensity to spend of 0.20. That is, a one billion riyal increase in oil 
revenues would result in an expansion of allocations to defense of 0.03 
billion in the same year (in constant prices). Over time (three to five years), 
the government tended to expand its allocations to defense by 0.20 billion 
riyals. In contrast, the short and long run propensities to spend oil revenues 
on defense were respectively: 0.87 and 0.34 for the 1960-73 sub-period, and 
0.16 and 0.03 for the 1973-85 sub-neriod. 
In terms of causality, since oil revenues make up a significant portion of 
gross domestic product, the results were of no great surprise: 
1. For the period as a whole (1965-88), movements in total gross domestic 
product (at constant prices) tended to induce changes in the Kingdom's 
allocations to the military. In this sense, defense expenditures in Saudi Arabia 
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are endogenous, affected by economic growth and not vice versa. The 
average lag was three years -that is, the past three years growth in GDP was 
the best predictor of the growth in defense expenditure for any one year. 
2. Interestingly enough, except for government consumption, none of the 
other standard macroeconomic aggregates seem affected by past movements 
in the country's gross domestic product. 
While the relationship between total GDP and defense is fairly intuitive 
and straightforward, that between defense and non--0il GDP is more complex: 
1. For the period as a whole (Table 1 ), defense and non--0il economic 
activity appear closely interrelated, with neither variable being completely 
exogenous with respect to the other. That is, past movements (an optimal lag 
of four years) in defense tended to reduce somewhat increases in real non--0il 
output. On the other hand, increases in non--0il GDP tended (with an optimal 
lag of one year) to stimulate additional increases in defense expenditures. 
2. Over the last eighteen years, however, a clear pattern has emerged 
whereby defense expenditures have become intertwined with non--0il GDP. 
This new relationship has involved defense expenditures increasing non--0il 
GDP with an average lag of two years. In turn, increases in non--0il GDP 
facilitate (with a one year lag) expanded allocations for defense. 
3. Also during this period, the relationship between non--0il GDP and 
government consumption seems to have changed so that causation began to 
run largely from GDP to government consumption. One implication of this 
pattern is that defense expenditures have taken on a stronger role relative to 
government consumption in stimulating non--0il income. 
These findings suggest that at least on the aggregate level, the Saudi 
Arabian economy has not suffered from the relatively large defense burden 
assumed by the government. Based on an earlier study (Looney, 1987), 
however, several caveats are in order. 
That study found that in general defense expenditures have not had a 
neutral impact on the pattern of development in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the 
study concluded that, as with oil revenues, the impacts associated with 
defense expenditure occur over time. The net effect has been to retard growth 
in several key sectors, while stimulating expansion of others. Those sectors 
penalized by defense expenditures include: (a) agriculture, (b) manufacturing 
(other than oil refining), (c) electricity, water and power, and (d) services. It 
appears that substituting non-defense expenditures for allocations to the 
military on a riyal for riyal basis would have resulted in rates of growth 
higher than those actually observed. 
On the other hand, several sectors are likely to have benefited from 
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defense expenditures. These include (a) mmmg, (b) construction, (c) 
wholesale and retail trade, and (d) the ownership of dwellings. Shifting public 
sector allocations from defense to non-defense would have reduced the 
expansion of these sectors relative to the rates of growth actually achieved. 
6. Conclusions 
For the most part, cross-sectional studies have implicitly assumed that 
causation runs from defense to investment and/or growth. The five-country 
case studies examined above provide evidence that is somewhat at odds with 
this view. While there is little evidence supporting the alternative position 
that investment or growth causes defense. many countries have developed 
fairly elaborate feedback mechanisms whereby defense impacts on investment 
and growth and in turn is affected by that growth. In addition, while there is 
little evidence that defense hurts investment or growth, there is ample support 
for the position that: (a) the relationship between defense and investment or 
growth varies considerably among countries, and (b) the lag structures also 
differ greatly. 
Areas for future research should include a more rigorous examination of 
the manner in which defense affects growth - Keynesian linkages, investment 
stimulation and the like. Are defense expenditures fundamentally different 
from other types of government allocations in affecting growth and, if so, 
why? 
Appendix 
Testing for Unit Roots and Cointegration 
The time series must be stationary to yield valid Granger Tests (Granger, 
1988). In this regard the finding of ~ unit root in a time series indicates 
non-stationarity. In a well known paper, Dickey and Fuller (1981) suggested 
a method for computing a test for a unit root in a time series and presented 
critical values for their proposed tests with and without the trend variable 
included. Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests were performed using PC Give Version 
7. 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 107 
Table Al 
Unit Root Tests 
Country Variable Time Interval Dickey-Fuller Augmented DF 
Algeria: 
GDP 1967-88 -0.448 -0.7536 
A(GDP) 1967-88 -4.727* -3.648* 
Defense 1967-88 -1.503 -1.659 
A(Defense) 1967-88 -4.273 -4.139* 
Egypt: 
GDP 1965-87 -0.362 -1.319 
A(GDP) 1965-87 -3.197* -3.426* 
Defense 1965-87 -0.737 -0.792 
A(Defense) 1965-87 -4.642** -4.578** 
Syria: 
GDP 1962-87 -0.904 -0.905 
A(GDP) 1962-87 -5.237** -5.229** 
Defense 1962-87 -2.876 -2.347 
A(Defense) 1962-87 -4.501** -4.629** 
Israel: 
GDP 1955-87 -0.499 -1.364 
A(GDP) 1955-87 -3.297* -3.865* 
Defense 1955-87 -0.548 -0.893 
A(Defense) 1955-87 -4.861** -4.544** 
Saudi Arabia: 
GDP 1965-88 -0.231 -1.687 
A(GDP) 1965-88 -3.247* -3.999* 
Defense 1965-88 -0.777 -0.781 
A(Defense) 1965-88 -4.842** -4.785** 
• means significant at the 95% level. 
• • means significant at the 99% level. 
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.. ,., 
In a simple case where: 
where b = l which generates a random walk (with drift if a not equal to 
0). Here, the autoregressive coefficient is unitary and stationarity is violated. 
A process with no unit or explosive roots is said to be I(O); a process is I(d) 
if it needs to be differenced d times to become I(O). The Durbin-Watson 
(OW) statistic for the level of a variable offers one simple characterisation of 
this integrated property. For example, if x, is a random walk, OW will be 
very small. If x, is white noise, OW will be around 2. Very low OW values 
thus indicate that a transformed model may be desirable perhaps including a 
mixture of differenced and disequilibrium variables. 
The tests5 consisted of first performing the OF procedure on the logs of 
all variables: Here, the t-test on the lagged value is the relevant statistic (with 
critical values provided in MacKinnon, 1991, and Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1993). As noted above, these tests indicated non-stationarity. Next tests were 
performed on the first differences of the log values. In all cases these were 
significant at the 95% level (and often at the 99% level, see Table Al). 
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